![]() See SEL Service Bulletin dated for more details. ![]() If one tries to reset a password of a non-existent user, an error message indicates that this user does not exist.Ī Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format vulnerability in the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL RTAC) database system could allow an authenticated attacker to retrieve passwords. When a password reset request occurs, the server response leaks the existence of users. An attacker with access to the browser history can thus use the token again to change the password in order to take over the account.Īn issue was discovered in Serenity Serene (and StartSharp) before 6.7.0. The token expires only 3 hours after issuance and is sent as a query parameter when resetting. This token remains valid even after the password reset and can be used a second time to change the password of the corresponding user. A link contains a token that is used to reset the password. In 2.54, there is different API usage and/or random string insertion for mitigation.Īn issue in Bludit 4.0.0-rc-2 allows authenticated attackers to change the Administrator password and escalate privileges via a crafted request.Īn issue was discovered in Serenity Serene (and StartSharp) before 6.7.0. The memory dump can be a KeePass process dump, swap file (pagefile.sys), hibernation file (hiberfil.sys), or RAM dump of the entire system. In KeePass 2.x before 2.54, it is possible to recover the cleartext master password from a memory dump, even when a workspace is locked or no longer running. ![]() This allows Hazelcast Management Center users to view some of the secrets. In Hazelcast through 5.0.4, 5.1 through 5.1.6, and 5.2 through 5.2.3, configuration routines don't mask passwords in the member configuration properly.
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